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Euromarkets and Monetary Policy
The rapid growth of euromarkets in the 1960s
and 1970s generated extensive discussion about
the implications ofeuromarkets for domestic
monetary policy. Euromarket deposits held by
United States residents totaled $94 billion at the
end of 1985 compared to $8 billion in 1975.
This rapid growth may be partly explained by
the fact that euromarkets are a largely unregu-
lated environment which facilitates international
banking. Traditionally, this has meant that banks
offer deposits and provide loans in U.s. dollars
outside the United States, or under international
banking facilities not subject to U.S. banking
regulations. In recent years, however, banks in
euromarkets have reduced the extent to which
they accept deposits or issue loans on their own
account, and have instead facilitated the place-
ment of private credit instruments by underwrit-
ing their issue.
These innovations in international banking are
believed to have made the United States econ-
omy more vulnerable to external influences and
to have weakened the effectiveness of monetary
policy. This Letter discusses the implications of
euromarkets and recent innovations in interna-
tional banking for monetary policy.
Effectiveness of monetary policy
While monetary policy is concerned with the
behavior of a number of economic variables
(such as prices, interest rates, and exchange
rates), this Letter will focus on monetary policy's
impact on interest rates, which in turn have a
direct impact on investment and economic
activity. In particular, we will examine how
euromarkets may weaken the ability of monetary
policy to influence interest rates. To do so, it is
useful first to understand why people hold
money and how monetary policy works.
Businesses and households hold money to pay
their bills on time. Because of its usefulness in
transactions, the public is willing to hold money
(specifically currency and checkable deposits)
even though money typically pays no interest or
it pays interest below that paid by other assets.
The market, in turn, ensures that the returns on
assets that are alternatives to money are such
that the amounts of money andother assets out-
standing are all willingly held. For example, if
the public would like to hold more money than
is available at the prevailing interest rate (i.e.,
there is an "excess" demand for money), the
public will try to cash in other assets for money.
This exchange will raise the yield on assets that
are alternatives to money, making money more
costly to hold, until the excess demand for
money is eliminated.
Monetary policy affects interest rates by chang~
ing the supply of money, thereby bringing about
changes in the relative yields of otherassets that
will induce the public to accept the changed
money supply. A policy that shrinks bank
reserves forces banks to reduce their deposit lia-
bilities, or the money held by the public. The
result is an excess demand for money that will
tend to raise interest rates. Conversely, a policy
that expands bank reserves will tend to lower
interest rates.
The extent to which interest rates will respond to
monetary policy depends primarily on the exis-
tence of good substitutes for money. If other
assets that are good substitutes for money exist,
a small increase in their yield will suffice to
eliminate the excess demand for money. The
effect of monetary policy on interest rates in that
case will be small. Financial intermediaries,
including banks operating at home and in
euromarkets, may weaken the effectiveness of
monetary policy by creating deposits that are
relatively close substitutes for money.
Euromarkets
While the ability of domestic financial inter-
mediaries to offset monetary policy by creating
substitutes for money is ultimately limited by
reserve requirements, euromarkets do not face
this constraint. Euromarkets may offset monetary
policy in two ways: (1) euromarket deposits held
by domestic residents may partly substitute for
domestic money (specifically M1), and (2)
euromarket lending to domestic residents may
offset the effects of monetary policy on the credit
market.FRBSF
As an example, consider a monetary policy that
aims to tighten the money supply, and therefore,
domestic liquidity. The increase in interest rates
that results from tighter monetary policy would
encourage an increase in deposits created in
euromarkets. If those deposits were good sub-
stitutes for domestic money, such deposit crea-
tion in euromarkets would offset the intention of
the contractionary monetary policy.
At the same time, higher interest rates may
encourage euromarkets to increase lending to
domestic residents. Increased lending, if it offset
the reduced availability of domestic loans,
would weaken a contractionary monetary policy
by lessening the tendency for interest rates to
rise.
Euromarket activity may contribute to interest
rate volatility, and affect monetary policy, by
changes in the demand for euromarket deposits
as well by variations in their supply. For exam-
ple, a shift in the preferences of asset holders in
favor of euromarkets could raise domestic inter-
est rates, and require offsetting action on the part
of monetary authorities.
A number of factors limit the extent to which
euromarkets reduce the effectiveness of domes-
tic monetary policy. Transaction costs and con-
siderations of liquidity and risk limit the total
amount of euromarket deposits created by the
banking system, even though the absence of
reserve requirements in euromarkets is an incen-
tive for banks to create such deposits. In particu-
lar, banks doing business in euromarkets hold
deposits with banks in the U.s. as a form of
"reserves" to satisfy their requirements for liqui·
dity and to settle accounts. The volume ofthese
deposits will tend to be affected by the avail-
ability of reserves for domestic banks.
Finally, the effect of euromarkets on the domes-
tic loan market would depend on the extent to
which banks use euromarkets as channels for
lending abroad rather than at home. Since sub-
sidiaries of u.s. banks account for the bulk of
euromarket lending to domestic residents,
reserve requirements on domestic borrowing
from euromarkets since 1969 have restricted
u.s. borrowing from the euromarket. At present,
a 3 percent reserve requirement applies on the
net balances owed by u.s. banks totheir non-
u.S. offices and international banking facilities,
and on credit extended by foreign affiliates of
u.s. banks or international banking facilities to
u.s. residents.
Recent financial innovation
Since the 1982 debt crisis, international inves-
tors have shown a preference for direct credit
(such as holding commercial paper) rather than
for euromarket deposits. At the same time, pres-
sures on the capital position of international
banks and a desire to increase the return on
assets have stimulated the creation of financial
instruments that would accommodate investor
demand for direct credit instruments while leav-
ing bank balance sheets unaffected.
As a result, in recent years, banks have facili-
tated the placement of private credit instruments
by underwriting their issue in international capi-
tal markets and providing guarantees rather than
by accepting deposits and issuing loans on their
own account. Other innovations (such as cur-
rency swaps, interest rate swaps, options and
futures) have enabled borrowers and lenders to
shift risk and to structure contracts to suit their
requirements more readily, and thus facilitated
direct acquisition and exchange of international
assets.
The neteffect ofthese developments has been a
sharp decline in the amount of international
credit for which banks act as intermediaries. The
implications for domestic monetary policy of
this new direction are ambiguous. On the one
hand, the decline in euromarket deposit creation
would tend to enhance the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy. On the other, the new role of banks
in bringing together lenders and borrowers
implies that U.s. residents may find it easier to
hold foreign bonds and foreign residents may
find it easierto hold domestic bonds.
This development would weaken the ability of
domestic monetary authorities to influence inter-
est rates. In particular, because the new financial
instruments do not directly affect bank balance
sheets, reserve requirements would not be as
effective in restricting U.s. borrowing from
euromarkets. As a result, borrowing from inter-
national capital markets would have greater
















On the other hand, u.s. borrowing from interna-
tional capital markets (both bank and nonbank)
increased. Thus, while the euromarket deposits
held by u.s. residents in U.s. bank subsidiaries
declined by over $7 billion in 1984, total lend-
ing (including direct credit underwritten by
banks in euromarkets) to U.s. residents in inter-
national capital markets increased $19.7 billion.
In 1985, 35 percent ofthe international note-iss-
uance facilities were for u.s. residents, making
the U.s. the largest borrower in this new market.
Financial innovations have provided a means for
avoiding the reserve requirements on direct bor-
rowing from u.s. bank subsidiaries in the
euromarket.
Conclusions
The use of euromarkets may weaken the effec-
tiveness of domestic monetary policy in two
ways: (1) by creating substitutes for domestic
money and (2) by acting as an additional source
of lending to U.s. residents. Indeed, euromarkets
have traditionally been a deposit outlet for u.s.
residents, providing an alternative asset that
could weaken the impact of domestic monetary
policy. The importance to domestic monetary
policy of u.s. borrowing from the euromarket
has been limited since, until recently, such bor-
rowing was very small.
More recently, the channel through which the
euromarkets affect domestic monetary policy
appears to be shifting away from being a deposit
outlet for u.s. residents. Recent innovations in
international banking and growing U.s. external
borrowing appear to be increasing the impor-
tance of euromarkets as a source offunds and
their role in facilitating the exchange of d~mes­
tic and foreign interest-bearing assets.
Since the decline in euromarket deposit creation
tends to enhance the effectiveness of monetary
policy, whereas the increased borrowing facili-
tated by banks in the euromarket may weaken it,
the implications of recent developments in inter-
national banking for monetary policy remain to
be fully explored.
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The chart illustrates the growth of euromarket
deposits held by u.s. residents in foreign
branches of u.s. banks in the 1980s. Euromarket
deposits grew from less than $60 billion in 1980
to $94 billion at the end of 1985. While the bulk
of this amount is in the form of euromarket
deposits.with a fixed term to maturity, the share
o! ~)Vernlg.hteuromarket deposits has grown sig-
nificantly In recent years. In contrast direct bank
lending to u.S. residents increased dver the
same period from $3 billion to $18 billion.
The chart also reveals that U.s. nonbank hold-
ings of euromarket deposits stabilized and then
fell after rising steadily through 1982, reflecting
the tendency for bank intermediation to decline
since the 1982 debt crisis.
Euromarkets and U.S. residents
Ofthe two channels - deposit creation and
loan supply - through which the euromarkets
could affect u.s. monetary policy, euromarket
?eposit creation has historically been more
Important. That is, euromarkets have served
largely as an outlet for deposits for U.S. residents
rather than as a source of loans to them, proba-
bly because of reserve requirements on borrow-
ing from euromarkets.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)













Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 212,036 3,679 7,820 3.8
Loans and Leases1 6 191,575 3,841 6,824 3.6
Commercial and Industrial 56,400 2,238 2,951 5.5
Real estate 67,600 142 1,584 2.3
Loans to Individuals 40,662 304 2,011 5.2
Leases 5,618 32 - 45 - 0.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 13,206 125 2,345 21.5
Other Securities2 7,255 - 287 - 1,349 - 15.6
Total Deposits 223,182 10,774 12,864 6.1
Demand Deposits 68,700 9,214 11,260 19.6
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 42,374 2,395 -10,314 - 19.5
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,097 1,125 4,919 32.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,385 435 - 3,315 - 2.4
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 47,070 388 1,115 2.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 31,799 - 313 - 6,250 - 16.4
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 27,153 1,926 304 1.1
Two Week Avera es Period ended Period ended
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings







1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes u.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change